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Note:  Since the “Petitioner” below is the “Respondent” in this Court 
(and vice versa), this filing refers to the McCleary family, Venema family, 
and Network for Excellence in Washington Schools (NEWS)1 as 
“plaintiffs”, and to the State as “defendant”.  Cf. RAP 10.4(e).    
I. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFFS’ COURT FILING 
This Court affirmed the February 2010 declaratory judgment that 
the State’s failure to amply fund its K-12 public schools is 
unconstitutional.2  To ensure the defendant State stops that 
unconstitutional underfunding, this Court Ordered the State to submit a 
court filing after each State budget is finalized.  This Court Ordered that 
each post-budget filing must: 
(1) “demonstrate steady progress” implementing the reforms 
promised under ESHB 2261, and 
(2) “show real and measurable progress towards achieving full 
compliance with article IX, section 1 by 2018.”3   
[See Part II below of this filing.]  
The State’s September 2012 post-budget filing does neither.  To 
the contrary, it acknowledges that the 2012 legislature chose to make 
virtually no progress implementing funding increases under ESHB 2261.  
[Part III below.]   It similarly acknowledges that the 2012 legislature 
chose to make virtually no progress funding the significant shortfalls the 
                                                 
1 The 399 community groups, school districts, and education organizations in NEWS 
are listed at “http://www.waschoolexcellence.org/about_us/news_members”.  
2 McCleary v. State, 173 Wn.2d 477, 539 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (“We affirm the trial 
court’s declaratory ruling and hold that the State has not complied with its Article IX, 
section 1 duty to make ample provision for the education of all children in Washington”).    




State has already identified in its school funding studies concerning 
Article IX, §1.  [Part IV below.]   
Plaintiffs fully appreciate the principle theme underlying the 
post-budget narrative filed by the State – i.e., that providing the significant 
K-12 funding increases required to comply with our State Constitution 
isn’t easy for elected officials to do.  Plaintiffs do not believe, however, 
that State government officials are only required to obey our State 
Constitution when it’s easy.  Plaintiffs believe the 2012 legislators’ 
decision to continue the State’s violation of Constitutional rights during 
the 2012/2013 school year is not Constitutionally acceptable.  Plaintiffs 
accordingly submit that the “appropriate step” for this Court to take is to 
firmly stand up as the one branch of State government that actually 
upholds (instead of just talks about) the Constitutional right of every 





II. THE ISSUE THIS COURT ORDERED THE PARTIES’ 
POST-BUDGET FILINGS TO ADDRESS 
A. What’s Not An Issue In This Case:                                                 
the nature of the State’s Article IX, §1 duty. 
1. The legal meaning of “paramount”, “ample”, “all”, 
“education”, and Article IX, §1 have been established.  
The February 2010 declaratory judgment ruling in this case 
established the legal meaning of “paramount”, “ample”, “all”, 
“education”, and Article IX, §1.4 
This Court affirmed that February 2010 declaratory judgment 
ruling,5 and expressly reaffirmed that: 
 paramount duty means that “the State must amply provide for 
the education of all Washington children as the State’s first and 




                                                 
4 February 2010 declaratory judgment [CP 2860-2971] at ¶¶151-212 . 
5 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 539 (“We affirm the trial court’s declaratory ruling and 
hold that the State has not complied with its Article IX, section 1 duty to make ample 
provision for the education of all children in Washington”).    
6 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520 (underline added).  That holding rejects the notion that 
K-12 funding restrictions are necessary to leave money for other important State 
programs – for the State has never disputed that it currently has plenty of tax revenue to 
cover the multi-billion dollar increase necessary to amply fund the State’s K-12 public 
schools if the State is required to provide that ample funding first – and that’s precisely 
what this Court held our Constitution requires the State to do:  “the State must amply 
provide for the education of all Washington children as the State’s first and highest 
priority before any other State programs or operations” McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520.  
This Court similarly rejected the State’s claim that a fiscal crisis can justify cuts to the 
State’s Constitutionally required ample education funding, reaffirming that the State may 
not make reductions “for reasons unrelated to education policy, such as fiscal crisis or 




 ample provision means “considerably more than just adequate”.7  
 all children means “each and every child” in Washington – “No 
child is excluded.”8  
 education means “the basic knowledge and skills needed to 
compete in today’s economy and meaningfully participate in this 
state’s democracy” – which are the knowledge and skills 
specified in the State’s Essential Academic Learning 
Requirements (EALRs), the four numbered provisions from 
ESHB 1209, and the Seattle School District decision.9  
 Article IX, section 1 “imposes a judicially enforceable 
affirmative duty” on the State.10 
 “Article IX, section 1 confers on children in Washington a 
positive constitutional right to an amply funded education.”11 
 This right to an amply funded education is each Washington 
child’s paramount Constitutional right.12 
                                                 
7 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 484.  See also id. at 527 (reiterating the Seattle School 
District Court’s holding that ample means “liberal, unrestrained, without parsimony, 
fully, sufficient”); and the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary cited by that 
Seattle School District Court (90 Wn.2d at 476, 511, 512 n.12, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)), 
which provides the following definitions (at pp. 1302, 2508, & 1645): liberal: “marked 
by generosity.” & “ABUNDANT, BOUNTIFUL”; unrestrained: “not restrained” & 
“UNCONTROLLED”; parsimony: “carefulness in the expenditure of money or 
resources”.   
8 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520. 
9 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 483, again at 522-524 & n.21 (holding this definition of 
“education” is the same as the definition of “basic education”); see also id. at 522-
523n.20 (quoting the current version of the four numbered provisions from ESHB 1209, 
codified at RCW 28A.150.210).  This Court accordingly rejected the State’s claim that 
the “education” required by Article IX, §1 is the same as the basic education program 
the legislature defines and funds.  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 531-532 (“The legislature’s 
definition of full funding amounts to little more than a tautology”) and at 526 (explaining 
the program to provide the above basic “education” is a separate matter).   
10 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 485, 514 (reiterating the Seattle School District Court’s 
holding). 
11 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 483, 518 (underline added). 




In short, the legal meaning of the affirmative legal duty that 
Article IX, §1 requires the State’s elected officials to obey is not subject to 
dispute in this case.13 
2. The State’s longstanding violation of Article IX, §1 has been 
established.    
The February 2010 declaratory judgment against the State held the 
State’s K-12 funding level was so low it violated Article IX, §1.14 
This Court affirmed that declaratory judgment,15 and expressly 
held that substantial evidence showed the State “has failed to adequately 
fund the ‘education’ required by Article IX, section 1”, that “the State has 
consistently failed to provide adequate funding”, and that this fact is so 
well known by the State that “[w]e do not believe this conclusion comes 
as a surprise.”16   
                                                 
13 This part of the Court’s McCleary decision was unanimous.  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d 
at 547-548 (concurring in part/dissenting in part, Madsen, C.J.) (“I agree with Justice 
Stephens’ articulation of the State’s duty to fund education under article IX, section 1 of 
the Washington Constitution and the conclusion that the current system is not operating 
at its constitutionally mandated levels.  .... [W]e have defined ‘education’, ‘paramount’, 
‘all’, and ‘ample’ and ordered the State to carry out its constitutional duty.”) 
14 E.g.,  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 529, 513 (quoting trial court’s conclusion that “State 
funding is not ample, it is not stable, and it is not dependable.”). 
15 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 539 (“We affirm the trial court’s declaratory ruling and 
hold that the State has not complied with its Article IX, section 1 duty to make ample 
provision for the education of all children in Washington”). 
16 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 530 (underline added) & 539.  This part of the Court’s 
McCleary decision was also unanimous.  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 547-548 (concurring 
in part/dissenting in part, Madsen, C.J.) (“I agree with Justice Stephens’ articulation of 
the State’s duty to fund education under article IX, section 1 of the Washington 
Constitution and the conclusion that the current system is not operating at its 




In short, the State’s ongoing, longtime violation of its legal duty 
under Article IX, §1 is not subject to dispute in this case.   
B. The One Remaining Issue In This Case:                                   
is the State diligently ending its violation of Article IX, §1?  
The trial court’s chosen remedy was to order the State to 
(1) establish the actual cost of amply providing all Washington children 
with the education mandated by this court’s interpretation of 
Article IX §1, and (2) establish how the defendant State will fully fund 
that actual cost with stable and dependable State sources.17     
On appeal, the State argued that wasn’t necessary because it had 
already done the studies it needed,18 and was substantially increasing its 
K-12 funding under ESHB 2261 by billions of dollars.19  The State also 
                                                 
17 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 513. 
18 E.g., State’s 8/20/10 Corrected Brief at pgs. 58-59 (telling this Court that the State 
has already done “significant studies of existing and prospective education programs, 
practices and funding mechanisms, including Washington Learns, the proceedings of the 
Task Force as assisted by studies by the Washington Institute for Public Policy and the 
Task Force Report itself.  ...  No additional court-ordered studies are necessary”);  
State’s 10/20/10 Reply Brief and Response to Cross-Appeal at p. 11 (“the State has 
already extensively studied education funding” – “Courts should not order a co-equal 
branch to do something that has already been accomplished”) and at p. 20 (“ESHB 2261 
has mooted [the trial court] remedy”).   
19 E.g., State’s 8/20/10 Corrected Brief, at p. 17 heading E (“In 2009, the State enacted 
ESHB 2261 to implement K-12 education reforms, including substantially increased state 
funding.”);  State’s 4/9/10 Statement of Grounds for Direct Review at p. 8  (“HB 2261 




assured this Court that it was increasing K-12 funding on a pace that 
would end the State’s violation of Article IX, §1 by no later than 2018.20   
To support its assurances to this Court, the State said it was, for 
example,  
 increasing K-12 funding to pay 95% of school districts’ 
current pupil transportation costs “by 2012”.21 
 increasing K-12 funding for school maintenance, 
supplies, and operating costs (MSOCs) “in the 2011-13 
biennium”.22   
 increasing K-12 funding to reduce class sizes “in the 
2011-13 biennium”.23   
 increasing K-12 funding for full-day kindergarten “in the 
2011-13 biennium”.24   
 increasing K-12 funding “by billions of dollars” through 
full implementation of ESHB 2261 no later than 2018.25   
 increasing K-12 funding by over $9.6 billion/year under 
ESHB 2261 alone.26   
                                                 
20 E.g., State’s 4/9/10 Statement of Grounds for Direct Review at p. 8 (ESHB 2261 is 
“implemented over a ten-year period, beginning in 2009 and concluding in 2018.  When 
fully implemented, HB 2261 will increase state funding of basic education by billions of 
dollars.”);  State’s 10/20/10 Reply Brief and Response to Cross-Appeal at p. 10 
(ESHB 2261 “was passed in 2009 and remains unchanged today, except for the further 
implementation of its provisions.  It still calls for complete implementation by 2018”). 
21 State’s 8/20/2010 Brief to Supreme Court, p.18. 
22 State’s 4/9/2010 Brief to Supreme Court, p. 8. 
23 State’s 4/9/2010 Brief to Supreme Court, p. 8. 
24 State’s 4/9/2010 Brief to Supreme Court, p. 8. 
25 State’s 4/9/2010 Brief to Supreme Court, p. 8. 
26 RP 3951:14-3953:2; 3965:10-3970:17; 4018:7-4021:10 & Exhibit 1483 [State 
testimony and Exhibit from one of the legislature’s Senior K-12 Fiscal Analysts (Ben 
Rarick), showing K-12 funding increase under ESHB 2261 alone totals over 
$9.6 billion/year (not including subsequent student enrollment increases or inflation), 




This Court vacated the trial court’s remedy in light of the State’s 
assurances that it would steadily increase K-12 funding to end the State’s 
violation of Article IX, §1 by no later than 2018 – but retained jurisdiction 
of this case to vigilantly ensure that the State actually did so.27     
C. The “Dialogue” Ordered By This Court After Each State 
Budget. 
“Trust, but verify”   
Ronald Reagan 
[quoting the Russian maxim “Dovorey No 
Provorey” while signing 1987 nuclear 
weapons treaty28] 
                                                 
27 This Court phrased the remedy issue as being a question of “what remedy this Court 
should employ to ensure that the State complies with its article IX, section 1 duty.”  
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 539-540.  The 7-Justice majority held this Court is retaining 
jurisdiction to ensure the State actually does what it promised, reiterating that “What we 
have learned from experience is that this court cannot stand on the sidelines and hope the 
State meets its constitutional mandate to amply fund education” (McCleary, 173 Wn.2d 
at 541), that in light of the legislature’s failures to yet provide the increased funding it 
had promised for MSOCs, full-day kindergarten, K-3 class size reduction, and pupil 
transportation, “This court cannot idly stand by as the legislature makes unfulfilled 
promises” (McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 545), that the State’s request to deferentially await 
its promised 2018 compliance was “unacceptable” (McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 544), that 
retaining jurisdiction was proper because “Ultimately, it is our responsibility to hold the 
State accountable to meet its constitutional duty under Article IX, section 1” (McCleary, 
173 Wn.2d at 546), and that since “success depends upon continued vigilance on the part 
of courts”, this Court “intends to remain vigilant in fulfilling the State’s constitutional 
responsibility under Article IX, section 1” (McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 547).  
28 President Reagan: “But the importance of this treaty transcends numbers. We have 
listened to the wisdom in an old Russian maxim. And I'm sure you're familiar with it, Mr. 
General Secretary, though my pronunciation may give you difficulty. The maxim is: 
Dovorey no provorey -- trust, but verify.”  The General Secretary: “You repeat that at 
every meeting.” [Laughter]   President Reagan: “I like it.” [Laughter]  Source: Remarks 
on Signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, December 8, 1987, Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library, 




All lawsuits entail some type of “dialogue” between the parties and 
court within the framework of the litigation.  This Court’s January 5, 2012 
decision did not specify the type or scope of dialogue this Court would 
establish within this litigation for its retention of jurisdiction in this case.   
So its July 18, 2012 Order did.  It mandated the specific type and 
scope of “dialogue” this Court would have with the parties in this 
litigation after each State budget is signed:  
1. The defendant State’s post-budget filing.   
This Court Ordered that after the signing of each State budget, the 
State shall make a filing in this lawsuit informing this Court of the State’s 
progress on two points: 
First, this Court Ordered the State’s post-budget filing to 
summarize the “actions taken towards implementing the reforms initiated 
by ... ESHB 2261”.29  This Court Ordered that each post-budget filing 
“must demonstrate steady progress according to the schedule anticipated 
by the enactment of the program of reforms in ESHB 2261.”30   
Second, this Court Ordered the State’s post-budget filing to 
summarize the actions taken towards “achieving compliance with 
Washington Constitution article IX, section 1”.31  This Court’s Order 
                                                 
29 Order ¶1 (underline added). 
30 Order ¶4 (underline added). 




expressly stated its review of each post-budget filing “will focus on 
whether the actions taken by the legislature show real and measurable 
progress towards achieving full compliance with article IX, section 1 by 
2018.”32  
2. Plaintiffs’ corresponding post-budget filing.   
This Court Ordered that the plaintiffs could then file a response 
addressing the adequacy of the State’s progress on those same two points:  
First, this Court directed that plaintiffs’ post-budget filing should 
present plaintiffs’ comments “addressing the adequacy of the State’s 
implementation of reforms”.33 
Second, this Court directed that plaintiffs’ post-budget filing 
should present plaintiffs’ comments “addressing the adequacy of the 
State’s ... progress towards compliance with article IX, section 1”.34 
3. Judicial review of parties’ post-budget filings. 
As noted earlier, this Court Ordered that each of the State’s 
post-budget filings “must demonstrate steady progress” under 
ESHB 2261, as well as “show real and measurable progress” towards full 
Article IX, §1 compliance by 2018.35  
                                                 
32 Order ¶4 (underline added). 
33 Order ¶3 (underline added). 
34 Order ¶3 (underline added). 




This Court’s Order accordingly concluded that “Upon reviewing 
the parties’ submissions, the court will determine whether to request 
additional information, direct further fact-finding by the trial court or a 
special master, or take other appropriate steps.”36   
4. The above judicial process is the type of “dialogue” specified 
by this Court’s Order.   
Legislators are understandably accustomed to the legislative 
process and the type of legislative dialogue that occurs between co-equal 
bodies of the legislature when the House and Senate have a policy 
disagreement on proposed legislation, and leaders from one co-equal body 
communicate with leaders of the other co-equal body to work out a 
compromise acceptable to both co-equals.37   
But as the judicial process specified in this Court’s Order confirms, 
this is a litigation dialogue instead – i.e., one where a court reviews the 
legally relevant facts established by the parties’ filings in light of the legal 
rulings in this case, and then determines the appropriate legal step the 
                                                 
36 Order ¶5. 
37 This negotiate-for-compromise among co-equals approach is reflected by the way 
the State submitted its post-budget filing – namely, a letter from Senator Frockt, 
Representative Alexander, and the members of their committee to Chief Justice Madsen 
and the members of this Court, with 2 enclosures (their committee’s 36 page report and a 
1 page letter from the Attorney General’s office certifying that the legislators’ letter and 
36 page report had been served on plaintiffs’ counsel.  Although footnote 2 of that 
36 page report references an “Appendix A” and its footnote 31 references an 
“Appendix B”, no Appendices were served on plaintiffs’ counsel, so they were apparently 




court should take to uphold and enforce the Constitutional mandate of 
Article IX, §1.   
In other words: the dispute in this case is not a policy difference 
between two co-equal bodies of the legislature (House and Senate), which 
is subject to negotiation and compromise in legislative dialogue between 
those two co-equals.  Rather, this case concerns an affirmative 
Constitutional right that the judicial branch is obligated to enforce – even 
when another “co-equal” branch prefers to violate that right instead. 
The structured litigation “dialogue” mandated by this Court’s 
Order in this litigation makes sense as a legal matter.  Although the 
judicial system in some countries might allow “dialogue” between a judge 
and defendant outside the courtroom to negotiate how the judge will 
resolve plaintiff’s lawsuit against that defendant, our State isn’t in one of 
those countries.38   
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Washington Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) and Washington Rules of 
Professional Responsibility (RPC).  Judges are not permitted to engage in ex parte 
communications outside of the presence of the parties or their lawyers concerning a 
pending or impending matter, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any 
facts that may be judicially noticed, unless expressly authorized by law.  CJC 2.9(A)&(C) 
(ex parte communications); see also CJC 2.4(A) (“A judge shall not be swayed by public 
clamor, or fear of criticism.”).  Similarly, the parties’ attorneys in this case (Plaintiffs’ 
counsel and the State Attorney General’s Office) are not permitted to engage in ex parte 
communications with the Court.  RPC 3.5 (“A lawyer shall not: (a) seek to influence a 
judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law; 
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized to 




This Court’s having limited the type of “dialogue” it will have with 
the parties also makes sense as a practical matter.  By setting a clear, 
narrow focus for the parties’ compliance filings after each State budget is 
finalized, this Court dictated that the parties’ submissions be limited to the 
only issue remaining in this case – i.e., whether the State is keeping its 
promises to (1) steadily increase K-12 funding under ESHB 2261, and 
(2) be in full compliance with Article IX, §1 by 2018.   
 
D. The Piece Of The State’s Post-Budget Filing That Addressed 
What This Court Ordered. 
Only a small portion of the State’s post-budget filing addressed the 
two points mandated by this Court’s Order – i.e., the actions in that budget 
that (1) demonstrate “steady progress” implementing ESHB 2261, and 
(2) show “real and measurable progress” towards full Article IX, §1 
compliance by 2018.39   
                                                 




The State’s post-budget filing explained the State’s education 














                                                 




The State’s “Executive Summary” of its funding for this 





Plaintiffs now address the adequacy of the State’s action with respect to 
the two previously noted points specified in this Court’s Order.42   
III. ADEQUACY OF THE DEFENDANT STATE’S PROGRESS 
UNDER ESHB 2261 
A. The State’s Testimony In This Case Set A Clear Benchmark 
To Measure “Steady Progress” Funding ESHB 2261  
To dispute plaintiffs’ claim that ESHB 2261 did not require 
specific dollar increases in K-12 funding, the State submitted sworn 
testimony from one of the legislature’s Senior K-12 Fiscal Analysts to 
show that fully funding the program of reforms in ESHB 2261 would 
increase the State’s K-12 education funding by over $9.6 billion/year.43  
                                                 
41 State’s post-budget filing at p. 1 (footnotes omitted). 
42 Plaintiffs respectfully request that their decision to follow this Court’s Order 
(instead of correcting the State’s long renditions on topics other than the two mandated 
by this Court for the parties’ post-budget filings) not be construed as plaintiffs’ 
agreement with the State’s self-serving rhetoric on those other topics.  
43 RP 3951:14-3953:2; 3965:10-3970:17; 4018:7-4021:10 & Exhibit 1483 [State 
testimony and Exhibit from one of the legislature’s Senior K-12 Fiscal Analysts (Ben 
Rarick), showing K-12 funding increase under ESHB 2261 alone totals over 
$9.6 billion/year (not including subsequent student enrollment increases or inflation), 
producing a State funding increase of at least $9,710 per student/year]. 
[T]he Legislature did not take further steps to implement the 
reforms established in ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776 beyond those 
already enacted in 2011.  The 2012 legislature rejected proposals 
to balance the budget by making reductions to the program of 
basic education, and the supplemental budget enacted in 2012 did 




The State itself has accordingly set $9.6 billion as a clear benchmark 
against which to measure “steady progress” funding its reforms under 
ESHB 2261.   
B. The State’s Post-Budget Filing In This Case Demonstrates The 
State Failed To Make “Steady Progress” Funding ESHB 2261. 
This Court Ordered that the State’s post-budget filing must 
demonstrate “steady progress” implementing the program of reforms in 
ESHB 2261.44  
“Progress” does not mean stepping backwards or standing still.  It 
means “to move forward : to proceed or advance”, “to develop to a higher, 
better, or more advanced stage : make continual improvements”.45 
And “steady” does not mean moving in fits and spurts.  It means 
“even development, movement, or action: not varying in quality, intensity, 
or direction”, “UNIFORM”, “CONTINUOUS”, “consistent in 
performance or behavior: DEPENDABLE, RELIABLE”.46 
There are nine school years between the legislature’s enactment of 
ESHB 2261 in the Spring of 2009 and its promised completion by 2018.  
Given the State’s sworn testimony in this case that the program of reforms 
                                                 
44 Order ¶4. 
45 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY (1993) at 1813; [Same dictionary this 
Court used in Seattle School District, 90 Wn.2d at 511 & 512n.12; see also February 
2010 declaratory judgment [CP 2860-2971] at ¶¶156 & 157].    




in that bill total over $9.6 billion/year, “steady progress” requires an 


























As this Court noted in its ruling, however, K-12 funding instead 
“sustained massive cuts” in the State’s biennium budget for the 2011/2012 
and 2012/2013 school years.47  And the State’s post-budget filing admits 
that even after this Court affirmed the February 2010 declaratory judgment 
against the State, the State still did not restore those funding cuts.48   
                                                 
47 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 511. 
48 E.g., State’s post-budget filing at p. 1 (“the Legislature did not make changes to 
basic education funding during the 2012 legislative session”). 
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This step backward is not “progress”.  The State’s post-budget 
filing demonstrates that while the State has continued to talk about 
funding ESHB 2261 ever since that bill’s enactment in the Spring of 2009, 
the 2012 legislature also continued the State’s failure to actually provide 
such funding.  The State’s post-budget filing demonstrates the State did 
not make the “steady progress” required by this Court’s Order.   
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C. The State’s August 2012 QEC Report Confirms The State’s 
Failure To Make Steady Progress Funding ESHB 2261. 
ESHB 2261 created a Quality Education Council (“QEC”) to 
oversee the phase-in of that bill’s promised reforms for full 
implementation by 2018.49   
The QEC reviewed the State’s funding for the 2012/2013 school 
year before the State made its filing in this case.  The QEC compared that 
funding to the funding levels needed to make progress under ESHB 2261.  
The QEC concluded the State was not making that needed progress, and 
even produced graphs to illustrate the State’s failure.50   
For example, the three graphs on the next page illustrate the most 
recently enacted budget’s failure to make progress in the transportation, 
MSOC, and full-day Kindergarten areas of underfunding that the court 
rulings in this case have discussed.  They show the funding level that was 
required for steady progress (the steep dark red line on top), the funding 
level the State chose to provide instead (the relatively flat left half of the 
light orange line on the bottom), and the funding increase needed to now 
                                                 
49 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 507.  As the Governor confirmed when signing ESHB 2261 
into law, “the timeline for implementation of various programs and formulae is left to the 
Quality Education Council.” Governor’s May 19, 2009 partial veto statement at 2nd to 
last paragraph;  cf. also Washington State Grange v. Locke, 153 Wn.2d 475, 490, 105 
P.3d 9 (2005) (Washington courts look to Governor’s interpretation of legislation as 
element of legislative history when interpreting statutes).   




catch up for the coming 2013/2014 school year (the steep right half of the 









In short:  these QEC charts graphically confirm the dispositive point that 
the State’s post-budget filing attempts to gloss over:  the State budget at 
issue did not make “steady progress” under ESHB 2261. 
 
IV. ADEQUACY OF THE DEFENDANT STATE’S PROGRESS 
TO FULLY COMPLY WITH ARTICLE IX, §1 BY 2018 
A. The State Has Already Set Several Minimum Benchmarks To 
Measure Its Progress Eliminating The State’s Unconstitutional 
Underfunding.  
The State has already set several specific benchmarks to measure 
its progress towards amply funding its K-12 public schools.  For example:   
                                                 




 February 2010 Starting Line: The February 2010 declaratory 
judgment affirmed in this case held the K-12 funding level set 
by the State was unconstitutionally low.52   
That unconstitutionally low K-12 funding level in 
February 2010 sets the starting line against which “progress” 
towards compliance with Article IX, §1 can be measured in 
this case.  
 
 
 Admitted NERC/MSOC Underfunding:  This Court 
repeatedly reiterated how the State woefully underfunds the 
actual cost of materials, supplies, and operating costs (formerly 
“NERCs”, now “MSOCs”),53 and how the State’s failure to 
increase funding after the February 2010 court ruling 
perpetuated that shortfall.54  This Court also recognized that the 
legislature has promised to fully fund those MSOCs by the 
2015/2016 school year.55   
The State’s testimony in this case admits that its NERC/MSOC 
underfunding is well over $500 million every year.56  This 
admitted annual underfunding amount sets a minimum 
benchmark against which progress can be measured for amply 
funding materials, supplies, and operating costs.  
 
 
 Admitted To/From Transportation Underfunding:  This 
Court reiterated that the State’s failure to fund the actual cost 
of transporting K-12 students to and from school is another one 
of the “major areas of underfunding” highlighted in this case,57 
and that the State’s token $5 million increase after the 
February 2010 court ruling “will barely make a dent” in the 
                                                 
52 The State budget’s K-12 funding level at that time was $15.5 billion/biennium.  
ESHB 1244, §§501-518. 
53 E.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 494, 508, 509 nn.17 & 18, 530, 532-535. 
54 E.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 511, 540, 544. 
55 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 510. 
56 Exhibit 616 at slide 1 ($585 million in the 2007/2008 school year); Exhibit 67 at 
slide 20 (over $500 million in the 2006/2007 school year).   




State’s perennial shortfall of over $100 million/year.58  This 
Court also recognized that the legislature set a “phase-in 
deadline of 2013” for its increased funding formula.59   
The State’s testimony in this case admits that its to/from 
transportation underfunding is significantly over $122 million 
every year.60  That admitted underfunding amount sets a 
minimum benchmark against which progress can be measured 
for amply funding student to/from transportation. 
 
 
 Admitted Market Salary Underfunding:  This Court noted 
that school salaries are another one of the “major areas of 
underfunding” highlighted in this case,61 and reiterated the 
State has “consistently underfunded” school salaries – funding 
“far short of the actual cost of recruiting and retaining 
competent teachers, administrators, and staff.”62 This Court 
further noted that despite the legislature’s declaring its intent to 
increase school salary funding,63 the State instead cut that 
funding after the February 2010 court ruling in this case – 
reducing teacher and staff salaries 1.9% and reducing 
principals’ and other school administrators’ salaries by 3.0%.64   
The K-12 compensation workgroup referenced in this Court’s 
decision has determined that the State underfunds K-12 salaries 
                                                 
58 E.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 545.  As the State’s post-budget filing confirms at 
p. 29 (1st bullet), with its $5 million transportation increase the State also made a change 
to its bus replacement schedule “saving” the State $49 million (budget speak for 
decreasing State funding to its school districts by $49 million) – thus resulting in a net 
decrease of $44 million in transportation related funding. 
59 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 507. 
60 Exhibit 356 at Appendix A (listing State’s underfunding, by specific dollar amount, 
for each school district, with a total underfunding amount of $122,493,341 in the 
2006/2007 school year).  
61 E.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 533. 
62 E.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 535-536, 532-533, 508, 498-499.  This Court further 
noted that this is not the first time it has told the State that the State’s funding does not 
approach the true cost of school salaries.  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 536 n.29. 
63 E.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 507. 




and benefits by over $2.8 billion every year.65  This 
underfunding amount determined by the State sets a minimum 
benchmark against which progress can be measured for amply 
funding K-12 salaries. 
 
B. The State’s Post-Budget Filing Shows The State Failed To 
Make “Real & Measurable Progress” Eliminating The State’s 
Unconstitutional Underfunding By 2018.  
This Court Ordered that the State’s post-budget filing must show 
“real and measurable progress towards achieving full compliance with 
article IX, section 1 by 2018.”66  
As noted earlier, “progress” means “to move forward : to proceed 
or advance”, “to develop to a higher, better, or more advanced stage : 
make continual improvements”.67 
                                                 
65 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 507 (referencing compensation workgroup and its initial 
December 2012 report deadline [which was later moved up to June 30, 2012 instead]); 
Compensation Technical Working Group Final Report, dated June 30, 2012, at pp. 45-48 
[http://www.k12.wa.us/Compensation/CompTechWorkGroupReport/ 
CompTechWorkGroup.pdf]  (Final Report Ex. 21 determining total increase in State 
salary payment including benefits for existing staffing levels in 2012 would be 
$1,425,730,000, Final Report Ex. 22 determining total increase in State salary, benefits, 
and substitutes for 10 professional development days in 2012 would be $483,236,000, 
and Final Report Ex. 23 determining total increase in State salary payment including 
benefits for staffing increases under SHB 2776 and QEC would be $927,175,000 
[$4,562,137,000 - $3,634,962,000 = $927,175,000].  The total increase from those three 
Final Report Exs. is therefore $2,836,141,000 [$1,425,730,000 + $483,236,000 + 
$927,175,000 = $2,836,141,000]); see also Compensation Technical Working Group 
Final Report at p. 22 (“the promising reforms [of ESHB 2261] will be just that – a 
promise – unless the Legislature fully funds the basic education program through the 
prototypical schools funding model and provides comparable wages as part of the state 
salary allocations.”) and at p. 80 (“The proportion of local revenue relied on by school 
districts is the highest since the Basic Education Act of 1977.”).   
66 Order ¶4. 




“Measurable” means “capable of being measured” and “great 
enough to be worth consideration: SIGNIFICANT”.68 
And “real” means “AUTHENTIC”, “GENUINE”, “not illusory : 
INDUBITABLE, UNQUESTIONABLE”.69 
The State’s post-budget filing does not show “real and measurable 
progress”.  For example: 
February 2010 Starting Line:  This case’s February 2010 
declaratory judgment held the State’s total K-12 funding level was 
unconstitutionally low70  – not an unexpected result since, as this Court 
repeatedly noted in its decision, the State’s funding studies had determined 
that “significantly increased funding” is required to support the State’s 
public schools.71  The State responded by making “massive cuts” to K-12 
funding in its biennium budget for the 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 school 
years.72  The State’s post-budget filing acknowledges: 
 The 2012 legislature maintained those K-12 funding cuts for 
the 2012/2013 school year.73   
 The 2012 legislature believes it deserves praise for not adding 
more cuts after this Court’s January 5, 2012 ruling.74 
                                                 
68 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY (1993) at 1399.  See also footnote 45.  
69 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY (1993) at 1890.  See also footnote 45. 
70 E.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 529, 513 (quoting trial court’s conclusion that “State 
funding is not ample, it is not stable, and it is not dependable.”). 
71 E.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 501, 530, 532. 
72 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 511. 
73 E.g., State’s post-budget filing at p. 1 (“the Legislature did not make changes to 




The State’s maintaining a K-12 funding level below the level 
declared unconstitutionally low in this case is “real”.  It’s “measureable”.  
But it’s not “progress”.  The State’s post-budget filing shows that the State 
has failed to make the “real and measurable progress towards achieving 
full compliance with article IX, section 1 by 2018” that this Court Ordered 
the State’s post-budget filing to show. 
Admitted NERC/MSOC Underfunding (> $500 million/year):  
The State’s post-budget filing acknowledges this Court affirmed the 
February 2010 ruling that the State unconstitutionally underfunds K-12 
materials, supplies, and operating costs (formerly “NERCs” / now 
“MSOCs”).75  Even though this Court recognized NERCs/MSOCs as 
being “woefully underfunded”,76 the State’s post-budget filing shows the 
State nonetheless chose to continue its NERC/MSOC underfunding this 
2012/2013 school year.77   
The State’s decision to continue its admitted underfunding again 
this school year is “real”.  It’s “measurable”.  But it’s not “progress”.  The 
                                                 
 
74 E.g., State’s post-budget filing at p. 1 (“the supplemental budget enacted in 2012 did 
not make reductions to funding for K-12 education”); at p. 35 (“the Legislature 
preserved K-12 education from further cuts as it balanced the budget”). 
75 State’s post-budget filing at p. 3 (“this Court upheld the trial court’s determination 
that the state had underfunded Non-Employee Related Costs (NERCs), student 
transportation, and staff salaries and benefits”).    
76 Supra footnotes 53 & 54. 
77 E.g., State’s post-budget filing at p. 1 (“the Legislature did not make changes to 




State’s post-budget filing shows that K-12 materials, supplies, and 
operating costs is a specific area where the State failed to make the “real 
and measurable progress” this Court Ordered the State’s post-budget filing 
to show. 
Admitted Transportation Underfunding (> $122 million/year):  
The State’s post-budget filing acknowledges this Court affirmed the 
February 2010 ruling that the State unconstitutionally underfunds K-12 
student transportation to and from school.78  Even though this Court 
recognized to/from transportation as one of the “major areas of 
underfunding” highlighted in this case,79 the State’s post-budget filing 
shows the State nonetheless chose to continue that underfunding in the 
2012/2013 school year.80   
That’s “real”.  The State’s choosing to continue its long-known 
underfunding of this K-12 expense forces schools to take money out of 
classrooms, educational programs, and local levies to cover the State’s 
continued funding shortfall.81   
                                                 
78 State’s post-budget filing at p. 3 (“this Court upheld the trial court’s determination 
that the state had underfunded Non-Employee Related Costs (NERCs), student 
transportation, and staff salaries and benefits”).    
79 Supra footnotes 57 & 58. 
80 E.g., State’s post-budget filing at p. 1 (“the Legislature did not make changes to 
basic education funding during the 2012 legislative session”). 
81 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 510 (noting legislature’s recognition that the 
State’s ending its underfunding of MSOCs and transportation will free up local levy 




The State’s continued underfunding of its schools’ to/from 
transportation costs is also “measurable”.  Indeed, the State’s testimony in 
this case acknowledged a specific dollar amount of underfunding for each 
one of the State’s school districts – for example: 
 $4,384,205/year for its Bethel School District (Pierce County) 
 $3,260,928/year for its Evergreen School District (Clark County)  
 $1,413,141/year for its Kennewick School District (Benton County)  
 $1,521,660/year for its Mead School District (Spokane County) 
 $3,805,418/year for its Tacoma School District (Pierce County) 
 $1,106,131/year for its Yakima School District (Yakima County) 
 Etc., etc., etc..82   
The State’s decision to nonetheless continue this admitted underfunding is 
not “progress”.   
The State’s post-budget filing accordingly shows student to/from 
transportation is another specific area where the State failed to make the 
“real and measurable progress” this Court Ordered the State’s post-budget 
filing to show. 
Admitted Market Salary Underfunding (> $2.8 billion/year):  
The State’s post-budget filing acknowledges this Court affirmed the 
February 2010 ruling that the State unconstitutionally underfunds K-12 
                                                 




school salaries.83  Even though this Court noted State funding falls far 
short of the actual cost of recruiting and retaining competent teachers, 
administrators, and staff,84 the State’s post-budget filing shows the State 
nonetheless chose to continue its underfunding for this 2012/2013 school 
year.85   
Indeed, the State chose to make this part of its underfunding even 
worse than what the trial court had found to be unconstitutional – for the 
State’s post-budget filing acknowledges the 2012 legislature chose to 
continue the prior salary cuts that put the State’s salary funding below the 
level declared unconstitutionally low in February 2010.86     
The State’s decision to fund K-12 school salaries this coming 
school year at a level below the level declared unconstitutional in this case 
is both “real” and “measurable”.  But a step backwards isn’t “progress”.  
The State’s post-budget filing shows K-12 market salaries is another 
specific area where the State failed to make the “real and measurable 
progress” this Court Ordered the State’s post-budget filing to show. 
                                                 
83 State’s post-budget filing at p. 3 (“this Court upheld the trial court’s determination 
that the state had underfunded Non-Employee Related Costs (NERCs), student 
transportation, and staff salaries and benefits”).    
84 Supra footnotes 61 & 62, see also footnote 65. 
85 E.g., State’s post-budget filing at p. 1 (“the Legislature did not make changes to 
basic education funding during the 2012 legislative session”). 
86 E.g., State’s post-budget filing at p. 1 (“the Legislature did not make changes to 




In short:  The State’s post-budget filing shows legislators continue 
to talk about providing ample funding for the State’s K-12 public schools.  
But it also shows they continued the State’s perennial failure to provide 
that funding.  The court rulings in this case do not say the State should talk 
about amply funding its public schools.  With all due respect to Nike®, the 
court rulings in this case ordered the State to “just do it”™.  The State’s 
post-budget filing, however, confirms the State did not make the “real and 
measurable progress” required by this Court’s Order.  
V. ADEQUACY OF THE DEFENDANT STATE’S 2012 
“PROGRESS”  
A. The State’s Dwelling On Other Topics Cannot Hide The 2012 
Budget’s Failure To Make Progress. 
This Court affirmed the February 2010 declaratory judgment ruling 
that the State’s failure to amply fund its K-12 public schools is 
unconstitutional.   
To ensure the State stops that lack of ample K-12 funding by no 
later than 2018, this Court Ordered the State to submit a court filing after 
each budget is finalized that must: 
(1) demonstrate “steady progress” implementing the reforms 
promised under ESHB 2261, and  
(2) show “real and measurable progress towards achieving full 
compliance with article IX, section 1 by 2018.”87   
                                                 




The State’s post-budget filing, however, focuses primarily on other 
matters such as:  
(3) the State’s preferred recharacterization of past events, court 
rulings, and legislation,  
(4) other “important” (but not paramount) things legislators 
choose to spend State revenue on,  
(5) rationalizations for legislators’ longstanding violation of 
Washington children’s paramount Constitutional right to an 
amply funded education, and  
(6) excuses for why it’s not easy for legislators to obey the 
Constitution they took an oath to uphold.  
The State previously tried to sell its rhetoric on these matters to the 
trial court – but after an 8-week bench trial, 55 witnesses, and over 500 
exhibits, the trial court issued detailed findings of fact and corresponding 
declarations of law that rejected the State’s rendition.   The State tried 
again in this Court – but this Court did not adopt the State’s renditions or 
reverse a single one of the trial court’s findings of fact or corresponding 
declarations of law on these matters.   
An elected official’s desire to repeat and publicize his or her 
favorable characterizations (rather than the courts’ unfavorable rulings) is 
entirely understandable from an election and public relations standpoint.  
And, as with many public relations pieces, it is therefore not surprising 




the inadmissible weight of unverified assertions not trustworthy or legally 
relevant.88   
But most importantly, this Court’s Order did not ask the State to 
repeat the State’s previously asserted (and judicially rejected) 
                                                 
88 Some of the premises asserted in the State’s post-budget filing are simply 
inaccurate.  For example, its premise (e.g., at p. 12) that the State’s “program of basic 
education” is the same as the “definition of basic education” – for the Court rulings in 
this case have held the opposite (see, e.g., supra footnotes 9 & 4).  Another example is its 
premise (e.g., at pp. 9 & 12) that fully funding ESHB 2261 constitutes full compliance 
with Article IX, §1 – for this Court expressly acknowledged that the Basic Education 
Finance Task Force work upon which ESHB 2261 is based left the school construction 
part of the State’s ample funding obligation to another day since that issue was being 
addressed by a separate task force (McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 503n.10; see also 
Exhibits 261 & 262).  Other parts of the State’s post-budget filing are legally irrelevant.  
For example, its rhetoric about “local implementation of the paramount duty” (p. 7) – 
for this Court has held that “school districts have no duty under Washington’s 
constitution.  Article IX makes no reference whatsoever to school districts.”  Tunstall v. 
Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 232 (2000).  Another example is the State’s long discussion of 
revenues and non-education expenditures State legislators choose to make (pp. 21-26) – 
for the State has never disputed that it currently has plenty of tax revenue to amply fund 
the State’s K-12 public schools if the State provides that funding first – and that’s 
precisely what this Court held our Constitution requires the State to do:  “the State must 
amply provide for the education of all Washington children as the State’s first and 
highest priority before any other State programs or operations.”  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d 
at 520).  Other parts of the State’s filing are simply misleading.  For example, its saying 
(p. 27, 2nd bullet) that the State increased funding for K-3 class size reduction by 
$33.6 million – when the State at the same time cut class reduction funding for K-4 by 
$214 million, producing a net decrease of over $180 million (McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 
545).  Another example is its statement that the legislature provided $5.8 million to fund 
the new principal and teacher evaluation system – for the costs that system imposes upon 
the State’s 295 school districts is far more than that $5.8 million amount. (e.g., FNS063 
Individual State Agency Fiscal Note, Section II.C, pp. 2-3, 5895 ESSB Certificated 
Employee Evals, 02/24/2012 Revised, confirming that “Additional resources are 
necessary to support 80 additional districts in their implementation of the 4-tier 
evaluation systems” and that “2,000 additional administrators would need to be trained” 
that are not accounted for in the current budget at 
https://fortress.wa.gov/ofm/fnspublic/legsearch.asp?BillNumber=5895&SessionNumber
=62)  Cf. State v. Kaiser, 161 Wn.App. 705, 719, 254 P.3d 850 (2011) (State prevailing 
in its argument that even “accurate” information can be deceptive if it has a statement or 
omission that is likely to mislead); cited with approval in Bain v. Metro. Mortgage 




characterizations of fact and law.  Instead, this Court Ordered a clear and 
narrow two-point focus for the State’s post-budget filing:  
(1) demonstrate “steady progress” implementing the reforms 
promised under ESHB 2261, and 
(2) show “real and measurable progress towards achieving full 
compliance with article IX, section 1 by 2018.”89   
Pursuant to that same Court Order, plaintiffs’ post-budget filing is 
addressing the adequacy of the State’s progress on those two points (rather 
than correcting the revisionist history and excuses repeated throughout 
most of the State’s post-budget filing).90   
B. The State’s Continued Failure Is Not Constitutionally 
Acceptable. 
Our State’s elected officials have known for 35 years that the 
paramount right of every child under our State Constitution is that child’s 
positive, Constitutional right to an amply funded K-12 education.91 
                                                 
89 Order ¶4. 
90 Order ¶3 (providing for plaintiffs’ “written comments addressing the adequacy of 
[1] the State’s implementation of reforms and [2] its progress towards compliance with 
article IX, section 1”).  Plaintiffs wish to be clear that their post-budget filing does not 
respond to the State’s assertions concerning matters other than the two progress points 
specified by this Court because plaintiffs believe parties in a lawsuit should adhere to the 
court orders in that lawsuit.  Plaintiffs’ silence on the many other matters upon which the 
State’s post-budget filing improperly dwelt therefore cannot legitimately be claimed by 
the State to be any sort of “agreement” with the inaccurate, misleading, and legally 
irrelevant characterizations of fact and law regarding those other matters in the State’s 
post-budget filing. 
91 E.g., Seattle School District, 90 Wn.2d at 511-512; February 2010 declaratory 
judgment [CP 2860-2971] at ¶¶144-149 and ¶¶157-161;  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 483, 




The State has also acknowledged the vital importance of this 
affirmative Constitutional right – never challenging any of the court 
rulings in this case that confirm the central role education plays in our 
democracy, our economy, and each citizen’s civil rights.92  For example, 
the fact that: 
 “A healthy democracy depends on educated citizens”.93  
 Education “plays a critical civil rights role in promoting 
equality”.94 
 An “amply provided, free public education operates as the 
great equalizer in our democracy, equipping citizens born into 
underprivileged segments of our society with the tools they 
need to compete on a level playing field with citizens born into 
wealth or privilege.”95 
 Education “is the number one civil right of the 21st century.”96  
As one of the Latino-American civil rights leaders at trial testified without 
disagreement from the State, “the only way that you can be free is to be 
fully educated.”97   
                                                 
92 February 2010 declaratory judgment [CP 2860-2971] at ¶¶118-142. Such 
unchallenged findings are now verities in this case.  E.g.,  Cowiche Canyon Conservancy 
v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 808-809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). 
93 February 2010 declaratory judgment [CP 2860-2971] at ¶119. 
94 February 2010 declaratory judgment [CP 2860-2971] at ¶132. 
95 February 2010 declaratory judgment [CP 2860-2971] at ¶132. 
96 February 2010 declaratory judgment [CP 2860-2971] at ¶134. 
97 RP 2597:16-18 (Roberto Maestas when explaining why El Centro de la Raza had 
named its early learning program after the revolutionary who had emphasized that point 
(José Martí)); accord, Epictetus, Discourses, Bk. II, ch. 1 (“Only the educated are free”).  
Or, as the trial court noted with respect to the cost of complying with Article IX, §1: it 
may sound like a lot of money, but “you know the old adage: if you think education is 




The February 2010 ruling in this case confirmed that State officials 
nonetheless continued for decades to knowingly violate this affirmative 
Constitutional right of all Washington children by knowingly 
underfunding the State’s K-12 public schools.  When this Court affirmed 
the declaratory judgment ruling in this case, it accordingly stated that 
“[w]e do not believe this conclusion comes as a surprise.”98    
State officials’ longtime violation of Washington children’s 
Constitutional right to an amply funded education is entirely 
understandable as a political matter because children do not vote.    
But it’s completely unacceptable as a Constitutional matter.  
Courts enforcing the Constitutional rights of public school children 
have made it clear that “a citizen’s constitutional rights can hardly be 
infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that they be.”99  
As the court in another public school case reiterated, the argument that 
Constitutional rights “must depend upon the majority vote has never found 
foothold under our form of constitutional government.  Democratic 
                                                 
98 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 539.  As Justice James Johnson noted during oral 
argument, “It’s not the first time in history the Legislature has approached a very 
difficult problem by kicking it down the road another session or another election.” 
http://www.tvw.org/scripts/iframe_video.php?eventID=2011060043C&start=2132&stop
=2141. 
99 U.S. v. Yonkers Board of Education, 837 F.2d 1181, 1224 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988) (quoting Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 
377 U.S. 713, 736-737, 84 S.Ct. 1459, 12 L.Ed.2d 632 (1964)); Haney v. County Board of 




government under our Constitution respects the majority will, but our 
forefathers had sufficient vision to ensure that even the many must give 
way to certain fundamental rights of the few.”100   
The U.S. Supreme Court has accordingly long held that the 
government may not escape liability merely because its unconstitutional 
action was undertaken in response to the desires of a majority of its 
citizens.101  The February 2010 ruling in this case similarly rejected the 
State’s suggestion that political priorities have a role in this Constitutional 
arena:  
During the trial, the State cross-examined many of the 
[plaintiffs’] education witnesses as to whether they 
would prioritize education at the expense of other 
worthy causes and services, such as health care, 
nutrition services, and transportation needs.  But this is 
not the prerogative of these witnesses – or even of the 
Legislature – that decision has been mandated by our 
State Constitution.  The State must make basic 
education funding its top legislative priority.102     
This Court could not have been clearer when it then reiterated that 
“Article IX, section 1 confers on children in Washington a positive 
constitutional right to an amply funded education” – a positive 
                                                 
100 Haney v. County Board of Education, 410 F.2d 920, 925-926 (8th Cir. 1969) (citing 
Federalist Papers No. 10 (Madison) and Federalist Papers No. 51 (Madison)).   
101 U.S. v. Yonkers Board of Education, 837 F.2d 1181, 1224 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433, 104 S.Ct. 
1879, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984)). 




Constitutional right that the State must fund “as the State’s first and 
highest priority before any other State programs or operations.”103   
The State’s supplemental budget covering the 2012/2013 school 
year was finalized and signed four months after this Court’s ruling.104  A 
budget which, as the State’s post-budget filing admits, did not make any 
changes to the State’s unconstitutionally low level of education funding.105 
As a Constitutional matter, it is completely unacceptable for the 
defendant State to have chosen to not make significant progress reducing 
its unconstitutional (and long-known) underfunding of its K-12 public 
schools this 2012/2013 school year.   
 
C. This Court Should Not Condone The State’s Failure By Sitting 
Silently On The Sidelines.  
1. This isn’t about faceless statistics. 
The hundreds of thousands of Washington children whose 
Constitutional right to an amply funded education continues to be violated 
every day are easy to dismiss as faceless statistics.   
                                                 
103 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 483, 518, 520 (underline added);  supra footnotes 11 & 6. 
104 2012 Supplemental Budget, Third Engrossed Substitute House Bill 2127, passed 
April 11, 2012, and signed (partial veto) May 2, 2012. 
105 E.g., State’s post-budget filing at p. 1 (“the Legislature did not make changes to 




But as one of the State Legislators who served on both Washington 
Learns and the Basic Education Finance Task Force summed up at trial, 
our State government’s longtime violation of children’s Constitutional 
rights is a tragedy rather than numbers and statistics – explaining that 
every day, every week, every month, every year that we delay means that 
additional students drop out, and additional students who don’t drop out 
are left unable to meet the requirements of today’s society.  It’s easy to 
talk about numbers.  It’s easy to talk about statistics.  But when it comes 
right down to it, every kid we lose is something that is very, very real.  
The great tragedy of the State’s long debate and delay is that we’re not 
talking about numbers.  We’re talking about real world kids.106     
                                                 
106 (Now-former) Representative Skip Priest trial testimony [RP 1168:12-1170:5], 
previously paraphrased in Plaintiffs’ November 19, 2010 Reply Brief in this Court.  In 
sharp contrast, compare someone else’s harshly opposing view about “tragedy” vs. 
“statistics”: 1947 January 30, Washington Post, Loose-Leaf Notebook by Leonard 
Lyons, at p. 9, Washington, D.C. (ProQuest Historical Newspapers);  [STL2] 1947 
January 30, Salt Lake Tribune, Lyons Den by Leonard Lyons, at p. 8, Column 3, Salt 
Lake City. (Newspaper Archive)  (Joseph Stalin’s dismissing other commissars’ concerns 
about famine in the Ukraine by saying “If only one man dies of hunger, that is a 




The State’s own publications in this case also confirm that the kids 












2. There’s no “separation of powers immunity” for violating 
Constitutional rights. 
The State’s longtime practice of appointing another task force, 
forming another workgroup, or doing another study, makes perfect sense 
from the perspective of a government official wanting to reduce State 
expenses in the upcoming biennium – for it’s much cheaper to fund 
                                                 
107 Exhibit 192, cover and p. 2.  
What does the Washington State 
Constitution say about K-12 public 
school funding? 
 
“It is the paramount duty of the state to make 
ample provision for the education of all 
children residing within its borders, without 
distinction or preference on account of race, 
color, caste, or sex.” 
         -Washington Constitution, article IX, section 1 
 
This constitutional provision is unique to 
Washington.  While other states have 
constitutional provisions related to 
education, no other state makes K-12 




another study, workgroup, or taskforce than it is to fund the significant 
funding shortfalls identified by the last study, workgroup, or taskforce.108   
But State officials’ decision to continue violating Article IX, §1 
does not make sense from the perspective of the child whose 
Constitutional right to an amply funded K-12 education continues to be 
violated every day at school.   
The State’s repeated practice of funding a new study instead of 
funding the significant shortfalls identified by its last study is politically 
and financially convenient.  But it’s also unconstitutional.  And as most 
lawyers (but perhaps not all legislators) know, “unconstitutional” means 
“illegal”.   
This Court has long recognized that one of the judicial branch’s 
central roles is to serve as “a check on the activities of another branch” – 
even when the Court’s decision “is contrary to the view of the Constitution 
taken by another branch.”109 
                                                 
108 This Court noted many (but not all) of the State’s prior studies at McCleary, 173 
Wn.2d at 491-505, 530-540.  See also, e.g., Exhibit 333, Exhibit 125, Exhibit 360, 
Exhibit 262 at p. 171, Exhibit 262 at p. 161, Exhibit 262 at p. 119, Exhibit 357, 
Exhibit 16, Exhibit 262 at p. 1, Exhibit 215, Exhibit 261, Exhibit 356, and Exhibit 124.      
109 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 515 [citing Seattle School District, 90 Wn.2d at 496; In re 
Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d 232, 241, 552 P.2d 163 (1976); U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
703, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
176, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)]; accord, McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 544 (“As a coequal branch of 
state government we cannot ignore our constitutional responsibility to ensure compliance 
with article IX, section 1”); see also State v. Rice, 174 Wn.2d 884, 279 P.3d 849, 857 
(2012) (the constitutional division of government into three branches is for the protection 




The declaratory judgment entered in this case over 2½ years ago 
held the defendant State’s perennial underfunding of its K-12 public 
schools is unconstitutional (illegal).  And the State knows that a court 
judgment legally binds the defendant during appeal unless the defendant 
seeks and secures a stay of that judgment.110   
Indeed, the State’s response to the trial court’s declaratory 
judgment ruling in the Seattle School District case confirms that 
knowledge – for the State did not seek or secure any stay of the trial 
court’s declaratory judgment in that case, and thus promptly increased its 
K-12 funding even though the State had appealed.111   
The defendant State did not seek or secure a stay of the declaratory 
judgment entered against it in this case either.   
                                                 
 
Kansas, 112 P.3d 923, 930 (Kan. 2005) (“state courts consistently reaffirm their 
authority, indeed their duty, to engage in judicial review and, when necessary, compel 
the legislative and executive branches to conform their actions to that which the 
constitution requires”). 
110 Filing an appeal on the merits does not relieve the appellant of the obligation to 
comply with the trial court’s order.  RAP 8.1(b) (trial court decision is enforceable 
pending appeal or review unless that decision is stayed).  In civil cases that are neither 
money judgments or decisions affecting property, the appellant must file a motion with 
the appellate court seeking a stay.  RAP 8.1(b)(3), RAP 8.3 (stay must be obtained by 
motion of the party). 
111 The Seattle School District trial court entered its Judgment and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on March 17, 1977, and the State filed its appeal on March 31, 
1977.  The legislature’s House and Senate passed the Basic Education Act on June 20, 
1977.  LAWS OF 1977, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 359, § 22 (1977) (Washington Basic Education 
Act of 1977).  The legislature’s House and Senate then enacted a State Budget with 
increased K-12 funding the next day (June 21, 1977).  LAWS OF 1977, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 
339, § 175 (1977).  This Court did not rule on the State’s appeal until September 28, 




But this time, the State chose to simply disregard the court 
judgment against it – even going so far as to cut K-12 funding lower than 
what that court judgment had declared to be unconstitutionally low.112    
The State’s post-budget filing confirms that the State continues to 
think it is free to disregard the court rulings in this case – for it 
conspicuously failed to demonstrate “steady progress” under ESHB 2261, 
and also failed to show “real and measurable progress” towards full 
Article IX, §1 compliance by 2018.  
Separation of powers does not give the legislative branch a free 
pass to disregard court rulings or Constitutional rights – for if it did, “the 
constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery”.113   
                                                 
112 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 511 and 544. 
113 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958) (explaining that 
if a legislature could, at will, annul the judgment of a court and destroy the rights 
acquired under that judgment, “the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery” 
(internal quotations omitted)); Montoy v. Kansas, 112 P.3d 923, 930-931 (Kan. 2005) 
(“courts consistently reaffirm their authority, indeed their duty, to engage in judicial 
review and, when necessary, compel the legislative and executive branches to conform 
their actions to that which the constitution requires”  –  and when the workings of the 
political process “lead to a continued constitutional violation, judicial action is entirely 
consistent with separation of powers principles and the judicial role. Although state 
constitutions may commit educational matters to the legislative and executive branches, if 
these branches fail to fulfill such duties in a constitutional manner, ‘the Court too must 
accept its continuing constitutional responsibility ... for overview ... of compliance with 
the constitutional imperative.’ Moreover, unlike federal courts, state courts need not be 
constrained by federalism issues of comity or state sovereignty when exercising remedial 
power over a state legislature, for state courts operate within the system of a single 
sovereign”) (internal quotations omitted);  Lake View School District v. Huckabee, 91 
S.W.3d 472, 484 (Ark. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1035 (2003) (“This court’s refusal to 
review school funding under our state constitution would be a complete abrogation of 
our judicial responsibility and would work a severe disservice to the people of this state.  




Constitutional case law accordingly confirms that a court can force 
the legislative or executive branch to comply with the Constitution by 
issuing orders which, for example:  
 impose monetary contempt sanctions against legislative branch 
officials;114   
 prohibit government expenditures on certain other matters until 
the court’s Constitutional ruling is complied with;115 
                                                 
 
field of education.  As Justice Hugo Black once sagely advised: ‘[T]he judiciary was 
made independent because it has ... the primary responsibility and duty of giving force 
and effect to constitutional liberties and limitations upon the executive and legislative 
branches.’ Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 865, 870 (1960).”); Rose 
v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186, 208-209 (Ky. 1989) (“we must address 
a point made by the appellants with respect to our authority to enter this fray and to 
‘stick our judicial noses’ into what is argued to be strictly the General Assembly’s 
business.  ....  To avoid deciding the case because of ‘legislative discretion,’ ‘legislative 
function,’ etc., would be a denigration of our own constitutional duty.  To allow the 
General Assembly (or, in point of fact, the Executive) to decide whether its actions are 
constitutional is literally unthinkable.    ....    This [judicial branch] duty must be 
exercised even when such action serves as a check on the activities of another branch of 
government or when the court’s view of the constitution is contrary to that of other 
branches, or even that of the public.”). 
114 E.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276, 280, 110 S.Ct. 625, 107 L.Ed.2d 
644 (1990) (approving of $1 million per day contempt sanction until city council enacted 
desegregation legislation, and observing that if that sanction failed, the court could then 
address sanctioning individual council members), compare Id., 430 U.S. at 281-306 
(Brennan, J. and three other Justices dissenting, opining that sanctions against individual 
council members were warranted immediately without any giving them a second 
chance.);  Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691-692, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) 
(acknowledging that appropriate contempt penalties against state officials failing to cure 
unconstitutional prison conditions can include monetary fines and jail terms). 
115 E.g.,  Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375, 1384-1386 (M.D. Fla. 1981),  
aff’d in relevant part, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983) (retaining jurisdiction and 
enjoining defendant city from spending “any funds on the construction or improvement of 
municipal services in the white community until such time as the street paving, storm 
water drainage and water distribution systems in the black community are on par with 
that of the white sections” and further impounding and escrowing all federal revenue 
sharing funds to be used only to improve municipal services in the black community);  
Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 232-233, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 
L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) (enjoining county officials from paying grants or giving tax 




 order the legislature to pass legislation to fund specific 
education amounts;116 
 prohibit the State from limiting an education program to less 
than all eligible students in a given grade level;117   
 order the sale of State property to fund Constitutional 
compliance;118   and    
 issue a writ of mandamus to the legislature to compel 
performance.119 
 
3. It’s not “unprecedented” for a court to force the government to 
stop violating Constitutional rights. 
Although some State officials have complained that this Court’s 
retaining jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the court rulings in this 
                                                 
 
Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976) (after legislature failed to fully fund new 
school funding statute that court said would be constitutional only if fully funded, court 
held it would enjoin the State from expending any school funds (including the payment of 
debts, contractual obligations, pension contributions, insurance premiums, and facilities 
maintenance) unless the State fully funded that statute for the upcoming school year ). 
116 E.g., Montoy v. Kansas, 112 P.3d 923, 940-941 (Kan. 2005) (ordering legislature to 
fund at least $285 million for upcoming school year based on state cost study), Arthur v. 
Nyquist, 547 F.Supp. 468, 477-482 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d 712 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984) (ordering mayor and city council to appropriate 
$7.4 million to comply with desegregation remedy);  Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51, 
55, 110 S.Ct. 1651, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990) (while federal court could not impose property 
tax increase directly, it could require local school district to levy taxes at a rate adequate 
to fund desegregation remedy); Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board, 377 U.S. 
218, 233, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) (district court could order local 
government to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen public school system without 
discrimination). 
117 Hoke County Board of Education. v. North Carolina, 731 S.E.2d 691 (N.C. 2012) 
(enjoining State from denying any eligible at-risk four year old admission to 
pre-kindergarten program, after State placed a 20% cap on the number of at-risk 
students to be served by program).    
118 Reed v. Rhodes, 472 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (ordering sale of surplus land 
and buildings to fund desegregation remedy and requiring bimonthly financial 
accounting to court). 




case is “unprecedented”, a court’s retaining jurisdiction to ensure the 
defendant complies with the court’s ruling is not unprecedented.120  
To the extent anything is “unprecedented” in this case, it is 
Washington officials consciously choosing, year after year after year, to 
continue violating the Constitutional rights of hundreds of thousands of 
Washington children.   
D. The “Appropriate Step” For This Court To Take Is To Stand 
Up As The One Branch Of State Government That Upholds 
(instead of just talks about) Every Washington Child’s 
Constitutional Right To An Amply Funded K-12 Education. 
“Americans can always be trusted to do the right thing.   
Once all other possibilities have been exhausted.”  
Winston Churchill121   
Washington State legislators have been studying, confirming, and 
reconfirming the State’s ongoing failure to amply fund its K-12 public 
                                                 
120 E.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. 1976) (retaining jurisdiction to 
ensure that legislature fully funded new education statutes; and, when legislature failed 
to provide funding, issuing injunction to shut down public schools if not so funded).  
Montoy v. Kansas, 112 P.3d 923, 929, 941 (Kan. 2005) (retaining jurisdiction to 
determine whether state complied with decision ordering increased education funding); 
see also Montoy v. Kansas, No. 99-C-1738, Decision and Order Remedy (May 11, 2004), 
2004 WL 1094555, at *6-7 (observing that courts in Massachusetts, North Carolina, and 
New York likewise retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance with education funding 
decisions);  Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490-491, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 
(1992) (acknowledging that courts in desegregation cases have authority to retain 
jurisdiction to supervise and control defendant school districts); Green v. County School 
Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968) (“[T]he court should 
retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely 
removed”). 
121 Source: Langworth, Richard. Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of 




schools ever since the trial court’s declaratory judgment ruling in the 
Seattle School District case over 35 years ago.  Plaintiffs wish the 
legislative branch could now be trusted to obey our Constitution and 
amply fund our State’s K-12 public schools.  But history has shown – and 
the State’s 2012 post-budget filing unfortunately confirms – that the 
legislative branch can be trusted to do that only after all other possibilities 
have been exhausted.   
Plaintiffs accordingly submit that the “appropriate step” for this 
Court to take in response to the State’s post-budget filing is to issue a 
strong, firm, unequivocal Order that exhausts possibilities for further 
stalling and delay by the defendant State.  Plaintiffs respectfully request 
that this Court vigorously assert – rather than timidly shy away from – this 
Court’s Constitutional duty to uphold and enforce the paramount 
Constitutional right of every Washington child currently sitting in our 
State’s K-12 schools to an amply funded education.  A positive 
Constitutional right that is equally held by all Washington children – not 
just those children who are more privileged, more politically popular, or 
more easy to teach.122   
                                                 
122 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520 (“all children” under Article IX, §1 means “each and 
every child” in Washington – “No child is excluded.”); February 2010 declaratory 




This Court emphasized in its January 5, 2012 ruling that “positive 
constitutional rights do not restrain government action; they require it.”123  
And that that in turn “require[s] the Court to take a more active stance in 
ensuring that the State complies with its affirmative Constitutional 
duty.”124  This Court accordingly assured every child in our State’s public 
schools that this Court will not just “stand on the sidelines and hope the 
State meets its Constitutional mandate to amply fund education.”125 
The “appropriate step” for this Court to take is therefore to stand 
up as the one branch of State government that upholds (instead of just 
talks about) every Washington child’s Constitutional right to an amply 
funded K-12 education.  Plaintiffs accordingly submit that the 
“appropriate step” for this Court to take is to issue a firm, unequivocal 
Order that (hopefully) forces our State officials to put their perennial 
excuses and foot-dragging to an end, by making it emphatically and 
unmistakably clear that:  
(1) The State’s post-budget filing did not demonstrate “steady 
progress” in fully funding the reforms promised under 
ESHB 2261, and did not show “real and measurable 
progress” in achieving full Article IX, §1 compliance by 
2018. 
(2) The State’s failure to make that required progress in its 
2012 budget is Constitutionally unacceptable. 
                                                 
123 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 519 (underline added). 
124 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 519. 




(3) This Court will therefore take firm action (the form or type 
of which elected officials might not like) if the State’s 2013 
budget fails to make significant progress fully funding the 
reforms promised under ESHB 2261 as well as achieving 
full Article IX, §1 compliance by 2018.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Back in February 2010, the trial court ruled that the defendant 
State’s continued failure to amply fund its public schools is 
unconstitutional.   
The State’s 2012 post-budget filing is long.  But it doesn’t 
demonstrate real, measurable, or steady progress stopping the State’s 
longtime violation of Washington children’s Constitutional right to an 
amply funded K-12 education.  
Instead, the State’s post-budget filing demonstrates another year of 
delay.  It basically says “Legislators have been talking about school 
underfunding for many many years now, they didn’t increase funding for 
this 2012/2013 school year because it’s not a convenient time right now, 
but legislators are looking busy with a bunch of busywork, and whoever’s 
elected in November might start to make some progress next year for kids 




Many parents talk about “teachable moments” for their kids.  The 
step this Court chooses to take in response to the parties’ post-budget 
filings in this case presents a teachable moment not just for the McCleary 
and Venema children who are plaintiffs in this case, but also for every 
student currently in our State’s public schools.  That is because this 
Court’s response will teach our upcoming generation of Washington 
citizens a fundamental lesson about whether our Constitution really 
matters.  Does our Constitution grant citizens legally enforceable rights, or 
just make hollow suggestions that courts allow government officials to 
reject if politically convenient?  In our State, is a Constitutional mandate 
an order that the government must obey, or just a suggestion that it may 
obey if it wants to?  
As the history of enforcing Brown v. Board of Education 
illustrates, forcing recalcitrant State officials to pay the political and 
monetary price of complying with school children’s Constitutional rights 
can be a hard path for the judicial branch to take.  But that same 
experience also confirms that the hard path is the Constitutionally correct 




Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court take the harder path of 
Constitutional enforcement, rather than the relatively easy path of political 
convenience.    
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